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Purcell: NOTES
Lesser Included Offenses in Florida

meaningful if left to the discretion of the penal authorities. In this
way the turpitude inherent in conviction of crime could be effectively
measured and subordinated to the positive correctional aptitude of
each individual prisoner.
If the courts6 7 and penal authorities were granted power over a
prisoner's loss and restoration of rights, then such loss and restoration
could become an effective tool for rehabilitation. These rights are
basic muniments of citizenship. They should be and can be made
meaningful only when considered with relation to each individual
prisoner. Society must recognize that the convicted offender will
never be a good citizen until he is treated like one; he will never be
able to take his place as a responsibile member of society until the
basic modes of exercising that responsibility are again accorded him.
PxED

A. BiY~R

LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES IN FLORIDA
Florida's criminal procedure statutes indicate three specific situations in which it is necessary to understand what is meant by the expression 'lesser included offense." In any criminal prosecution "upon
an indictment or information for any offense the jurors may convict
the defendant . . . of any offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged."' Upon conviction and motion for a new trial, the
judge, if he thinks the evidence does not sustain the verdict, can
adjudge the defendant guilty of an offense supported by the evidence
and necessarily included in the crime charged in the indictment or
information.2 And finally, if on appeal the evidence is shown not to
sustain the conviction but would sustain a conviction of a necessarily
included lesser offense, the appellate court is authorized to reverse the
judgment with directions to the trial court to enter judgment for the
67. To a certain limited degree this has already been done.
note 57 supra.

See text at

1. FLA. STAT. §919.16 (1961).
2. FLA. STAT. §920.06 (1961).
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lesser offense.3 Even from this brief glance at the procedure statutes
it can be seen that the "lesser included offense" is a concept of considerable importance in the criminal law of Florida. It is quite possible
for a single criminal case to involve all three of the situations covered
by the statutes, thus calling on the jurors, the trial judge and the appellate judges to deal with the concept. Viewed in this context the
task of determining what offenses are necessarily included in another
becomes a primary concern which can substantially affect the rights of
the accused. The objective of this note is to explore this problem of
determining lesser included offenses as it relates to the accused's right
to be informed of the charge against him and of his right to protection
from double jeopardy.
Tm TEnsT

INc ui

FoR L~ssia

Om-rNsEs

In formulating the procedural rules relating to lesser included offenses, the legislature failed to specify any method for determining
whether a particular offense is necessarily included in another. Other
jurisdictions, faced with a similar situation under similar statutes, have
arrived at different solutions to the question of what constitutes a necessarily included offense. There are two generally recognized tests,
and when the problem has been squarely faced it has usually involved
the determination of "whether the yardstick for measuring offenses
'necessarily included' in a charge ... is the specific language of the
accusatory pleading or whether such yardstick is the language of the
statute defining the offense charged.

.

. :,4 These two tests, the accu-

satory pleading and the statutory definition test, represent quite different approaches to the task of deciding what lesser offenses are
included in a criminal charge. The accusatory pleading test emphasizes the allegations of fact contained in the indictment or information, and thus may possibly call for different results in different cases.
With this test statements as to the inclusion of one offense in another
are meaningless except within the context of a particular case. The
statutory definition test, on the other hand, takes a more static approach independent of the particular case. Under this test if the
statutory definition of one crime embraces all the elements in the definition of another, the latter crime is said to be a lesser included offense of the former.
The California Supreme Court has decided that the "yardstick" to
be used is the accusatory pleading rather than the statutory definition.3 New York, which has a statute regulating convictions for lesser
3.

FLA. STAT. §924.34 (1961).

4. People v. Marshall, 48 Cal. 2d 894, 401, 309 P.2d 456, 460 (1957).

5. Ibid.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol16/iss2/10

2

NOTESIncluded Offenses in Florida
Purcell: Lesser

included offenses similar to that of California,6 has also adopted the
position that the allegations of the pleading govern.7 The contrary
position, that the statutory definitions of the two crimes provide the
test of inclusion, has been accepted in Louisiana 8 and Utah.9
The great majority of states have not decided the precise issue of
statutory definition versus accusatory pleading as the test for lesser
offenses. Florida is among this majority. The Florida Supreme Court
has not explicitly adopted any fixed test-a situation that has led to
some uncertainty. At times the court has taken a quite circular approach, as it did in Pittman v. State.10 Considering the inclusion of
aggravated assault in the crime of assault with intent to kill, the court
said: "the two offences are of the same character and they are in the
same line, and the latter offence is included in the former just as an
assault is included in an assault and battery."-" At other times the
rough test of inclusion has been whether "without the commission of
the lesser offense the greater cannot be committed."' 2 A more recent
statement of the court has questioned whether the greater offense
cannot be proved unless the lesser is proved.' 3 These tests, if they can
be called that, do little more than state the problem in different language. The Florida constitution provides that the accused has the
4
right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him.1
This guarantee includes the right of the accused to know the lesser
included offenses of which he might be convicted. In the absence of
a definite "yardstick" for determining those lesser offenses, how is a
defendant to enjoy the benefits of this constitutional protection? Do
the uncertain statements of the court insure with sufficient certainty
that a defendant will be informed of the precise accusation against
him so that he may be prepared at trial to meet that charge and the
lesser charges included therein?

6. N.Y. CoDE CRm. Pnoc. §445.
7. People v. Zielinski, 247 App. Div. 573, 288 N.Y. Supp. 175 (4th Dep't
1936); People v. Miller, 143 App. Div. 251, 128 N.Y. Supp. 549 (1st Dep't
1911), aft'd, 202 N.Y. 618, 96 N.E. 1125 (1912).
8. State v. Poe, 214 La. 606, 38 So. 2d 359 (1948); State v. Roberts, 213
La. 559, 35 So. 2d 216 (1948).
9. State v. Rohletter, 108 Utah 452, 160 P.2d 963 (1945); State v. Solomon, 93 Utah 70, 71 P.2d 104 (1987).
10. 25 Fla. 648,6 So. 437 (1889).
11. Id. at 654, 6 So. at 439.
12. Sanford v. State, 75 Fla. 893, 397, 78 So. 340, 341 (1918).
13. Statev. Harris, 136 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1962).
14. FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights, §11.
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Some Cases of Little Difficulty
In certain cases there is little argument as to whether one offense
is included in another, regardless of the test employed. In prosecutions under the habitual criminal statutes15 a charge of having been
convicted four times of felonies includes the lesser charge of having
been twice convicted of felonies.' 6 Another rather uncontroversial example was presented by State v. Harris,'7 wherein the Supreme Court
held that issuing a worthless check is included in the offense of obtaining property in exchange for a worthless check. The court recognized
no standardized test, but merely compared the statutory definitions
and noted that the greater offense could not be proved without proving the lesser.' 8 In the opinion of the Third District Court of Appeal
in this same case, it was indicated that the information against the defendant contained specific charges only as to the greater offense.' 9
However, the Supreme Court felt that the information properly
charged both crimes and thus was adequate to sustain a conviction of
the lesser offense.2 0 The distinction between grand and petit larceny
provides the basis for still another example of cases in which the courts
have experienced little difficulty with the lesser included offense issue.
In numerous cases the appellate courts have reversed judgments for
breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny with directions to the trial court to enter judgment for the lesser offense of breaking and entering with intent to commit petit larceny.21 These cases
express no uncertainty concerning the inclusion of the lesser offense.
The main concern has been with the sufficiency of the evidence as to
the value of the property involved.
From these cases wherein little difficulty has been encountered, no
definite test for determining lesser included offenses can be gleaned.
This is not unexpected since the examples present obvious cases for
the inclusion of the lesser offense. Use of either the statutory definition or the accusatory pleading "yardstick" would not give a different
result. These cases likewise do not involve situations in which a conviction for the lesser included offense is likely to infringe upon the
defendant's right to be informed of the precise charge against him.
15. FLA. STAT. §§775.09, .10 (1961).
16. Scott v. Mayo, 159 Fla. 816, 32 So. 2d 821 (1947).
17. 186 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1962).
18. Id. at 687.

19. Harris v. State, 128 So. 2d 752 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
20. State v. Harris, 136 So. 2d 633, 687 (Fla. 1962).
21. E.g., Jalbert v. State, 95 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1957); Bronson v. State, 152

Fla. 28, 10 So. 2d 718 (1942); Isaac v. State, 184 So. 2d 38 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1961); Channell v. State, 107 So. 2d 284 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
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Crimes Divided Into Degrees
The statutes dealing with lesser included offenses are also concerned with offenses divided into degrees.2 2 A conviction of a lesser
degree of a crime presents no great problem of informing the defendant of the charge against him; the lesser degrees of which he might be
convicted are clearly laid out by statute. The lesser degrees of a
crime can be ascertained simply by referring to the statutes. Because
of this and since crimes of degree and lesser included crimes have certain similarities, some inquiry into the courts' treatment of crimes of
degree is necessary. Perhaps the initial question should be whether
any distinction is to be made between lesser included offenses and
lesser degrees of crime. The language of the criminal procedure statutes suggests that the legislature contemplated such a distinction. 23
And in Isaacv. State the court made the following differentiation: 2 4
The degrees [of a crime] are distinguished, not by a difference
in the particular act performed, but by the circumstances surrounding it or the conditions under which it occurs .... To
be included in a greater offense as a lesser offense, an act must
be one that is itself defined by statute as an offense independent of, and apart from that defined as the greater offense in
which it may be included.
However, the courts have not been scrupulous observers of any intended distinction. In Blanco v. State25 it was held that armed robbery includes the lesser offense of unarmed robbery. As authority for
its holding the court cited the statute dealing with the determination
of the degrees of an offense.26 In Jimenez v. State,27 a prosecution for
rape wherein the defendant contended that the lower court should
have instructed the jury to either convict of rape or acquit, the court
held that the trial court had the duty to charge the jury as to the lesser
offense of assault with intent to rape. In the opinion the court cited in
full both the statute dealing with convictions of lesser included offenses and the statute dealing with convictions for lower degrees of
the offense charged. 28 The lack of active distinction is apparent.2 9
22. FLA.STAT. §§920.06, 924.34 (1961).
28. Florida Statute 920.06 begins: "In cases where the offense is divided
into degrees or necessarily includes lesser offenses . . ..
The corresponding
statute for the appellate level, Florida Statute 924.34, begins: "In a case where
the offense is divided into degrees or necessarily includes lesser offenses .. .
24. 134 So. 2d 38, 39 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
25. 150 Fla. 98, 115, 7So. 2d 333, 340 (1942).
26. Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19554, §229 (now FLA. STAT. §919.14).
27. 158 Fla. 719, 80 So. 2d 292 (1947).
28. Jimenez v. State, 158 Fla. 719, 722, 80 So. 2d 292, 294 (1947).
29. Goswick v. State, 137 So. 2d 863, 865 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962), reo'd
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What difference does it make that the courts have been neglectful
of what might appear to be an academic distinction? A factual example may help to illustrate why the distinction should be heeded. A
defendant charged with first-degree murder is well aware of the possibility of being convicted of any lesser degree of the homicide charge.
The lesser degrees of homicide are clearly defined by statute. There
is no necessity to resort to any test to determine those lesser degrees.
Since the defendant can be found guilty of the degree charged or any
lesser degree, 30 it is possible to have a conviction of a homicide which
is contrary to the evidence and which is not factually pleaded. 31 Second-degree murder, for example, is not included in first-degree murder
in the sense that the greater degree contains all the elements of the
lesser degree.3 2 This discrepancy between the facts alleged and the
necessary elements of the offense for which a conviction is had is even
more apparent where the defendant is convicted of third-degree murder on an indictment for first-degree murder.3 3 But now suppose the
defendant is charged with some serious crime not divided by statute
into degrees. There are no statutes indicating which offenses are necessarily included in the crime charged. Reference to some form of
test is necessary if the defendant is to know of what crimes he can
possibly be convicted.
Goswick v. State and the Search for a Test
While some cases admit to an easy solution, others can involve
close questions of inclusion of lesser crimes. The confusion exists because there is no explicit criterion for determining lesser included
offenses, as can readily be seen in Goswick v. State.34 The defendant,
Goswick, had attacked the prosecuting witness by beating him with a
steel rod, and was informed against and convicted for the crime of
aggravated assault. The trial judge refused to instruct the jury that
148 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1962).
30. FLA. STAT. §919.14 (1961).
31. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 88 Fla. 186, 101 So. 852 (1924); Prevatt v.
State, 82 Fla. 284, 89 So. 807 (1921); Johnson v. State, 55 Fla. 41, 46 So.
174 (1908).
82. See Rivers v. State, 75 Fla. 401, 78 So. 343 (1918), wherein the
defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree on an indictment for
murder in the first degree, and on appeal argued as ground for reversal that the
evidence supported first-degree murder. The court refused to set aside the verdict upon the ground that it was contrary to the evidence where the evidence
produced would have supported a verdict of guilty of the greater offense.
33. Clemmons v. State, 43 Fla. 200, 80 So. 699 (1901).
34. 143 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1962), reversing 187 So. 2d 863 (3d D.C.A. Fla.

1962).
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assault and battery is a lesser included offense under a charge of aggravated assault. The defendant appealed, urging that failure to give
the requested instruction was reversible error. The Third District
Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction 5 on the ground that the objection raised was too general to be the basis for reversal. The court declined to decide the precise issue of whether assault and battery is a
lesser included offense of aggravated assault, since such a decision was
unnecessary in ruling on the defendant's objection. The court's avoidance of the question is difficult to understand, especially in the light of
a prior decision of the Supreme Court in McCormick v. State.36 In
that case it was expressly stated that the evidence submitted to support a charge of aggravated assault might well be sufficient to support
a finding of guilt of assault and battery. Because of this apparent
conflict with its earlier decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The court noted a substantial difference between the two crimes. The
gist of aggravated assault is "the character of the weapon," necessitating the use of a deadly weapon. A battery depends upon the character of the act, that is it must necessarily include some actual physical
contact with the victim. Assault and battery requires both an assault
and a battery; aggravated assault may be committed without a battery. The court held, however, -that when the evidence in a trial for
aggravated assault would support a conviction for assault and battery
the trial judge should instruct the jury as to the lesser offense. The
court summarized as follows: 37
The crime of assault and battery is not necessarily a lesser included offense in the more serious crime of aggravated assault.
Nevertheless, it is possible for the evidence in a particular case
to reveal that an accused might properly be convicted of the
lesser offense of assault and battery under a charge of aggravated assault, if there is a battery and the jury should conclude
that the weapon was not deadly.
The Goswick case represents an ad hoc approach to a particular
situation, the necessity of instructing the jury regarding a given lesser
offense. The case might be viewed, however, as proposing a definite
test for lesser included offenses, that is the evidence produced at the
trial. For the purpose of determining which offenses should be included in instructions to the jury, this test is not unreasonable. There
is perhaps no better determinant of lesser included offenses than the
evidence produced at the trial. But for the purpose of informing the
35. Goswick v. State, 137 So. 2d 863 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
36. 153 Fla. 838, 16 So. 2d49 (1943).
87. Goswick v. State, supra note 34, at 820.
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defendant of the specific charges against which he must defend, the
test is inadequate. It is possible that only after the close of the State's
case would the defendant be informed of all the crimes of which he
might be convicted. A request for a bill of particulars may serve to
mitigate this possibility, but even this, as we shall see, would not eliminate the problems raised when double jeopardy becomes a considera38
tion.
If the yardstick to be used for determining lesser offenses is the
evidence presented at trial, then it is impractical to make any generalizations concerning the inclusion of a given offense in another. Only
within the context of the particular case could such a determination be
made. In this the approach of the Goswicl case is similar to the accusatory pleading test. Both methods are geared to the facts of the
particular case; the former emphasizes the facts produced in evidence,
and the latter stresses the facts alleged in the pleadings. If in the
Goswick case facts showing a battery were alleged in the information,
use of the accusatory pleading test would have made assault and battery a lesser included offense, and absent such allegations the lesser
crime would not have been included in aggravated assault. Had the
statutory definition test been used the distinctions between the two
crimes, as outlined by the court, would have precluded inclusion of
the lesser offense.
If the objective is to inform the defendant prior to trial of the nature of the charge against him, the best test for lesser included offenses
is the accusatory pleading test. In general, a misnomer or inaccurate
designation of a crime in the caption or other part of the indictment or
information will not vitiate it if there is sufficient detailing of the facts
constituting the offense in the body of the pleadings so that the defendant is fully apprised of the nature of the charge against him. In
such a case the statement of facts controls and the defendant stands
charged with the offense specifically alleged. 39 This statement of the
law supports the view that the specifically pleaded allegations and not
the statutory definition or the evidence produced at trial should be the
measure of lesser included offenses.
It should be noted that the court in Goswick was not actually concerned with establishing a broad general test for determining what
lesser offenses are included in a criminal charge. The court's concern
was with the necessity of an instruction to the jury in regard to a particular lesser offense. This represents but one situation in which the
38. See subheading, "Lesser Included Offenses and the Plea of Former
leopardy," infra.
89. 27 Am. JuR. Indictments and Informations, §65 (1958). See Lewis v.
State, 154 Fla. 825, 19 So. 2d 199 (1944).
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question of what is a lesser included offense must be answered. There
are other situations in which the question arises, and in these the
method of including or excluding lesser offenses by reference to the
trial evidence may not work so well. Cases involving pleas of former
jeopardy represent such a situation.
LEssER INcLuDED OFNSES AND Ta

PLA op FolImER JEopAimY

"No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.

. . .,4

This familiar prohibition of double jeopardy

forms one of the most important and interesting aspects of the cases
dealing with lesser included offenses. Two types of situations exist in
which the use of a defense of former jeopardy should be considered. A
conviction or acquittal of any given offense should bar a subsequent
prosecution for any lesser included offense. And if the given offense is
itself a lesser included offense of some more serious crime, then a subsequent prosecution for that greater offense should be barred. The
basis for this kind of "two-way" application of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy has in large part been developed in
cases involving crimes divided into degrees by statute, and those cases
provide the setting for its application to lesser included offenses. A
conviction of a lower degree of murder upon an indictment for a
higher degree is an acquittal of the greater offense.41 Florida Statute
920.09 recognizes this principle by providing that if a new trial is
granted, a defendant cannot be tried for or convicted of any higher
degree of crime than that of which he was first convicted. In a similar
manner a conviction or acquittal of any degree of murder should bar a
subsequent prosecution for any lower degree.4 2 But when we turn
from crimes of degree to lesser included offenses the difficulty once
again encountered is that of determining which offenses are included
in the original charge. The defense of former jeopardy has substance
only if it is possible to determine with reasonable certainty the of40. FLA. CoNsT. Deel. of Rights, §12.
41. E.g., Haddock v. State, 141 Fla. 132, 192 So. 802 (1939); McLeod
v. State, 128 Fla. 35, 174 So. 466 (1937); State ex rel. Landis v. Lewis, 118
Fla. 910, 160 So. 485 (1935); Johnson v. State, 27 Fla. 245, 9 So. 208 (1891).
42. It appears that this statement is arguable. See Note, 2 U. FLA. L. REV.
250, 254 (1949), where it is contended that upon an acquittal of a murder charge
the State could subsequently prosecute the defendant for any lesser degree of
the crime. However, in the same note, at page 255, the authors make the fol-

lowing point: "It can also logically be contended, inasmuch as Section 919.14
of Florida Statutes 1941 provides that the judge is to charge the jury that it
may return a verdict of guilty of any lesser degree of the crime charged, that

an acquittal in Florida is an acquittal of all such lesser degrees and bars a
subsequent prosecution for any of them."
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fenses included in the original charge, for as to those offenses the
defendant has been once subjected to jeopardy.
The opinion of the Florida Supreme Court in Sanford v. State48
applies the above principles to a rather complicated factual situation
which provides a good point of departure for a discussion of the double jeopardy aspect of lesser included offenses. The defendant was
indicted for rape and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of assault
with intent to rape. Earlier in the same year the defendant had been
convicted of assault and battery upon an information charging assault
with intent to rape. Despite the fact that both prosecutions grew out
of the same incident, the trial court sustained a demurrer to the defendant's plea of former jeopardy. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State is prohibited "from first prosecuting the
lower offense necessarily included in a higher and then prosecuting
the higher: 44 The court rejected the State's contention that a subsequent prosecution is barred only by a prior prosecution of a higher
45
offense.
To hold that a conviction or acquittal, in order to be a bar to
another prosecution, must be for an offense of a higher degree,
necessarily including the offense for which the accused stands
indicted, would subject the accused to a prosecution for each
of the lesser offenses included in a higher and finally a prosecution for the highest, which embraced all the lower grades,
thereby putting the accused in jeopardy several times for one
or more of the lesser offenses.
The decision in the Sanford case was based on the inclusion of
assault with intent to rape in the higher crime of rape, but the initial
conviction was for assault and battery. Had the original indictment
for rape contained allegations of a battery, which appears likely, the
accusatory pleading test would have called for the inclusion of assault
and battery in the charge. A similar result would have been reached
under the reasoning of the Goswick case if the evidence had shown a
battery. Whether the statutory definition test would have included
the lesser offense is uncertain but not unlikely. Now if we suppose
that the defendant had initially been indicted for assault and battery,
would this have barred a subsequent prosecution for the higher crime
of rape based on the same incident? If the language of the court in
Sanford is to be taken seriously, the subsequent prosecution for rape
should be barred if assault and battery is a lesser included offense.
48. 75 Fla. 393, 78 So. 340 (1918).
44. Sanford v. State, 75 Fla. 393, 401, 78 So. 340, 342 (1918).
45. Id. at 899, 78 So. at 342.
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But where the State chooses to prosecute first for the lesser crime, the
pleading or the evidence might not sustain the higher offense, thus
possibly leaving the defendant subject to a later prosecution for that
higher offense on the ground that as to that crime he had not been in
jeopardy. A similar analysis can be made of the Goswick case. It will
be recalled that there the defendant was charged with aggravated
assault and the evidence showed assault and battery to be a lesser ineluded offense. Suppose that later, on the same facts, the defendant
was charged with assault with intent to murder.46 Should not this
later prosecution be barred? 47 The language in Sanford indicates that
it should. 48 However, if -the first indictment or information did not
allege the necessary intent, the accusatory pleading test would not
make aggravated assault a lesser offense, and the later prosecution
might thus be permitted. And if the evidence at the trial did not
show the intent, the same result would be reached using the yardstick
suggested by the opinion in Goswick. But this would be an acceptance of the procedure that athe court denounced in Sanford, that is,
subjecting "the accused to a prosecution for each of the lesser offenses
included in a higher. ..
49
CONCLUSION

Any effort at protecting the rights of the accused in a criminal
prosecution would appear to require that the "yardstick" for determining lesser included offenses satisfy at least two basic requirements:
(1) Inform the defendant of the precise accusation against
him so that he may be prepared at trial -to meet that charge, and;
(2) Define the crime charged with sufficient particularity so
as to enable the defendant to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same
crime.
46. The opinion of the court in Goswick does not mention any intent on

the part of the defendant to kill the victim. But from the seriousness of the
attack it appears that the State might have attempted to try the defendant for the
higher crime of assault with intent to kill.
47. When the initial indictment is for the higher offense, assault with intent
to murder, rather than the lower, aggravated assault has been held to be an
included offense. State v. Febre, 156 Fla. 149, 23 So. 2d 270 (1945); Lindsey
v. State, 53 Fla. 56, 43 So. 87 (1907). Thus it would seem that a subsequent
prosecution for aggravated assault would be barred. This situation is but the
reverse of that posed in the text.
48. See discussion in text at note 43.
49. Sanford v. State, 75 Fla. 393, 400, 78 So. 340, 342 (1918).
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The absence of an established test to determine lesser included offenses works to obscure these requirements. How is a defendant to
know of what crimes he is charged if he is unable to rely on the courts
using a single and definite test to determine included lesser crimes?
And how is a defendant to enjoy fully the protection of the prohibition on double jeopardy if he cannot ascertain with reasonable certainty those crimes for which he has been placed in jeopardy?
It appears that the defendant is more fully informed when the
accusatory pleading test, rather than the statutory definition test, is
used. And reliance on the evidence at the trial as the measure of
lesser included offenses has the disadvantage of fully informing the
defendant only after the close of the prosecutions case. The accusatory pleading test not only informs the defendant of the offenses with
which he is charged, but also with the affarmative acts which the prosecution will attempt to prove. At the same time the prosecution is
limited since it is forced to restrict its proof to conform to those facts
charged. However, in order to afford the accused full protection,
these charges of fact cannot be regarded by the courts as mere surplusage. Logic and fairness would require that if the defendant could
be convicted of offenses indicated by the facts, he may also be afforded an acquittal on the failure of their proof.
When double jeopardy becomes a consideration, the adequacy of
any fixed test might be questioned. The accusatory pleading test
would provide adequate protection from double jeopardy in those
cases where the former prosecution is for a crime including lesser
charges. But when the initial prosecution is for an offense which is
itself a lesser offense of some higher crime, the accusatory pleading
test may fail to protect the defendant against double jeopardy. Perhaps the best solution to this problem would be to give the broadest
possible application to the language of Sanford v. State, thus barring
the State from prosecuting for successively higher offenses arising
from the same transaction.
JoHN
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